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Abstract
We examine an analyst with career concerns making cheap talk recommendations to a sequence of 
traders, each of whom possesses private information concerning the analyst’s ability. The recommenda-
tions of the analyst influence asset prices that are then used to evaluate the analyst. An endogeneity problem 
thus arises. In particular, if the reputation of the analyst is sufficiently high then an incompetent but strate-
gic analyst is able to momentarily hide her type. An equilibrium in which the market eventually learns 
the analyst type always exists. However, under some conditions, an equilibrium also exists in which the 
incompetent analyst is able to hide her type forever.
© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND 
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
JEL classification: D82; D83; G12; G14
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1. Introduction
A key task of financial analysts is to make recommendations to investors. As analyst abil-
ity is not directly observable, reputation – measured by rankings such as Institutional Investor’s
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J. Rüdiger, A. Vigier / Journal of Economic Theory 180 (2019) 304–335 305All-American Research Team – is a major factor affecting an analyst’s compensation.1 However, 
since a stock’s true value is unknown, evaluating the quality of an analyst’s advice is a compli-
cated task. Indeed, analyst forecasts influence prices which are later on used to evaluate analyst 
ability. This suggests that an incompetent but strategic analyst might be able to bias her recom-
mendations in order to appear better than she really is. Can incompetent analysts hide their type 
and, if so, how? What are the implications for market liquidity and asset prices’ convergence to 
the true asset values?
To address these questions, we propose a stylized model in the spirit of Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985) but in which traders obtain information through the recommendations of a financial an-
alyst (she). The analyst is either good (G) or bad (B). The revenue of the analyst in a period 
is an increasing function of the public belief that she is type G, which we refer to as the rep-
utation of the analyst. The (fixed) asset value is either high or low and each period the analyst 
receives a binary piece of information concerning the realized asset value. The G analyst receives 
more precise information than the B analyst. After receiving information, the analyst makes a 
cheap-talk recommendation, either “buy” or “sell”. The G analyst is truthful, but the B analyst 
makes recommendations with a view to maximize the expected discounted sum of her future 
revenues. A new trader (he) arrives each period. The trader is either a liquidity trader (i.e. trades 
randomly), or a profit-maximizing speculator. Each speculator privately observes a noisy signal 
of the analyst type. Trade takes place in a competitive dealer market, but market makers observe 
the recommendations with a lag.2 Reputation is updated at the end of each period based on the 
observation of the latest recommendation and trade order.
We start by showing that if the reputation of the analyst is sufficiently high then the analyst 
can momentarily hide her type. Increasing reputation simultaneously reduces the importance of 
speculators’ private signals about the analyst and increases the impact of the current recommen-
dation on a speculator’s valuation. Hence, when the reputation of the analyst is sufficiently high 
information incorporated in the latest recommendation trumps a speculator’s private signal about 
analyst ability: speculators buy with probability 1 following a buy recommendation and sell with 
probability 1 following a sell recommendation, preventing the market from learning about the 
analyst by observing the order flow.
We then show that the only possible way B can hide her type indefinitely is if her recom-
mendations are informative asymptotically. The intuition is as follows. As G is better informed 
than B , a speculator whose private signal provides unfavorable information about the analyst 
type will see his valuation drawn back toward the prior expectation of the asset value. The longer 
the history the greater the reversion toward the mean. By that logic, when the number of past 
recommendations is very large, either B’s recommendations are sufficiently informative so as to 
curb the reversion to the mean indicated above or speculators start trading based on their private 
1 According to Michaely and Womack (2005), “At most brokerage firms, analyst compensation is based on two major 
factors. The first is the analyst’s perceived (external) reputation. The annual Institutional Investor All-American Research 
Teams poll is perhaps the most significant external influence driving analyst compensation. All-American rankings are 
based on a questionnaire asking over 750 money managers and institutions to rank analysts in several categories: stock 
picking, earnings estimates, written reports, and overall service.” Leone and Wu (2007) and Fang and Yasuda (2014) find 
that reputation as measured by Institutional Investor’s ranking of analysts seems to be driven by skill. Groysberg et al. 
(2011) show empirically that analyst compensation is positively correlated to “All-Star” recognition and being named a 
top stock picker by the Wall Street Journal.
2 This reflects the fact that recommendations are often first disclosed to client investors before they are publicized 
(Michaely and Womack, 2005). In Rüdiger and Vigier (2017) we investigate under what circumstances traders are better 
informed than market makers.
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choose to buy the asset; those whose private signals are unfavorable choose to sell. Thus either 
B’s recommendations are informative asymptotically or the market eventually learns the analyst 
type. This implies in turn that, in equilibrium, either the market learns the analyst type or the 
market learns the true asset value.3 Our second main result goes on to establish that –in spite 
of the occurrence of informational cascades of the kind previously described– an equilibrium in 
which the market learns the analyst type always exists.
Under certain conditions, another equilibrium exists, in which the B analyst succeeds at hid-
ing her type forever. The conditions required are that (i) B possesses enough private information 
about the asset and that (ii) no speculator be too well informed about the analyst type. In the latter 
equilibrium B mimics G’s frequencies of buy and sell recommendations. At the same time the B
analyst ensures that her recommendations are sufficiently informative so as to induce the spec-
ulators to trade based on the recommendations rather than on their private signals of the analyst 
type. Consequently neither the order flow nor the pattern of recommendations made convey any 
information about the analyst. In an extension we show that in fact when the asset value is not 
fixed but follows a known Markov process then, even if she is completely uninformed, the B ana-
lyst can hide her type indefinitely. In that setting, uncertainty about possible value changes never 
decreases over time, allowing the B analyst to make recommendations that are never trumped by 
speculators’ private signals of the analyst type.
The related literature is discussed below. The model is presented in Section 2. Section 3 an-
alyzes an example illustrating the basic workings of the model. Section 4 contains our main 
results. The implications of our model for market liquidity and price discovery are examined in 
Section 5, where the example of Section 3 is simulated computationally. Changing asset values 
are examined in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
Related literature To the best of our knowledge the present paper is the first to analyze a se-
quential trading model in the spirit of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) but where traders’ information 
proceeds from the recommendations of an analyst with unknown ability and reputational con-
cerns. Specifically, in our model the market (a) learns about the asset value from the information 
of an analyst and (b) learns about the ability of the analyst from the order flow, given that spec-
ulators have private information about the analyst’s ability. The learning mechanism (a) is along 
the lines of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) (that is, essentially, the Bikhchandani et al. (1992)
statistical herding model with an endogenous price). Compared to Glosten and Milgrom’s set-
ting, the novel feature is the learning mechanism (b) concerning the ability of the analyst. The 
market can only learn about the analyst’s ability if the order flow is affected by the specula-
tors’ signals about analyst ability. In turn, learning about analyst ability impacts learning about 
the asset value, by enabling the market to assess the quality of the information supplied by the 
analyst.
Our paper bridges two strands of literature. The first strand examines the (lack of) aggregation 
of private information in sequential trade settings (Avery and Zemsky, 1998; Lee, 1998; Chari 
and Kehoe, 2004; Decamps and Lovo, 2006; Cipriani and Guarino, 2008; Dasgupta and Prat, 
2008; Park and Sabourian, 2011). The central difference between these papers and ours is that 
instead of being exogenous, in our paper traders’ information about the asset is provided by a 
financial analyst (with unknown ability) who may act strategically. The second strand of litera-
3 By “learning‘” we mean holding beliefs coming arbitrarily close to the realization of the relevant random variable.
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concerns (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Benabou and Laroque, 1992; Trueman, 1994; Ottaviani 
and Sørensen, 2006). The main difference between these papers and ours is the feedback channel 
through which the market learns about the analyst. In these papers the analyst forecasts asset 
values which are then observed (with noise). By contrast, in our model the asset value is never 
observed, and the main feedback channel is the order flow, which is endogenous. This difference 
is key since trade orders can be influenced, whereas fundamental asset values cannot. The next 
paragraphs discuss these papers in greater details.
The literature on informational cascades in financial markets builds on Bikhchandani et al. 
(1992) and Smith and Sørensen (2000). To the best of our knowledge Avery and Zemsky (1998)
were first to note that informational cascades are precluded in the framework of Glosten and 
Milgrom (1985), the reason being that price adjustment by competitive market makers pro-
vides incentives to traders and thereby prevents information getting trapped. The authors showed 
that herd behavior is however possible; the necessary and sufficient conditions for herding to 
occur are established by Park and Sabourian (2011). Various papers show how natural modi-
fications of the baseline framework could be reconciled with the occurrence of informational 
cascades.4 Lee (1998) introduces transaction costs; Chari and Kehoe (2004) relax the assump-
tion that traders move in a prespecified order; Decamps and Lovo (2006) consider traders and 
market makers who differ in their risk aversion; in Cipriani and Guarino (2008) traders’ util-
ity derived from the asset differs from that of the market makers; Dasgupta and Prat (2008)
consider traders who care both about reputation and about trading profits. In all of the afore-
mentioned papers, informational cascades about the asset value are possible. In our setting, the 
informational cascades are about the analyst type instead of being about the asset value. Yet 
the strategic behavior of the B analyst hinders price discovery since, by hiding her type, the 
B analyst prevents the market from efficiently evaluating information contained (or not) in the 
recommendations.
The literature on financial analysts with reputational concerns analyzes how such concerns 
may lead a strategic analyst to misrepresent her private information. Scharfstein and Stein (1990), 
Trueman (1994) and Ottaviani and Sørensen (2006) all develop the idea that in order to appear 
good, analysts strategically shade their forecasts toward the prior mean, thereby reducing the in-
formativeness of the recommendations made; in Benabou and Laroque (1992) the analyst cares 
about reputation but also engages in insider trading, creating an incentive for the analyst to mis-
lead the market in order to make more trading profits. As mentioned above, in all these papers, 
feedback concerning analyst type takes a very different form than in our setting. Instead of learn-
ing about the analyst by observing the true asset values, in our setting the market is forced to learn 
about the analyst’s type based on endogenous variables, namely traders’ response to the recom-
mendations. However, when the reputation of the analyst is sufficiently high, traders’ response 
to the recommendations are uninformative about the analyst type. An informational cascade then 
occurs (with respect to the analyst type).
4 The baseline framework has the following features: (i) the asset value is time-invariant, (ii) prices are set by compet-
itive market makers, (iii) trade is sequential, (iv) at most one unit of the asset is traded each period, (v) a trader is either a 
liquidity trader or a speculator, (vi) each trader is given one opportunity to trade at a predetermined time, (vii) there are 
no transaction costs.
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An analyst (she) makes cheap-talk recommendations to a sequence of traders (he) trading a 
risky asset in a competitive dealer market. The risky asset has value V : V = 1 with probability 12
and V = 0 with probability 12 . Time is discrete and indexed by t = 1, 2, . . . .
Analyst The analyst is either good or bad. Her type θ ∈ {G, B} is private information; ρt indi-
cates the beginning-of-period-t public belief that θ = G. We refer to ρt as the analyst reputation 
and assume that ρ1 ∈ (0, 1). Each period the analyst observes xt ∈ {0, 1}; conditional on θ and 
V , the sequence 
{
xt
}
t∈N is independent and identically distributed according to
P(xt = V | V, θ) = qθ , where 1 > qG > qB ≥ 12 .
The G analyst is therefore better informed than B , and B may be completely uninformed.
Recommendations The recommendation of the analyst in period t is denoted
rt ∈ {buyrec, sellrec},
with buyrec/sellrec standing for buy/sell recommendation. We assume that G makes truthful rec-
ommendations, i.e., conditional on θ = G, then rt = buyrec if and only if xt = 1. This assumption 
enables us to focus the analysis on B’s attempt to manipulate the market in order to appear to be 
type G. We discuss in Section 4 what would change if this assumption were relaxed.
Payoffs In each period t , the B analyst maximizes the expectation of the discounted payoff Ut
given by
Ut := u(ρt+1) + δu(ρt+2) + δ2u(ρt+3) + . . . ,
where u(·) is a strictly increasing function. These payoffs could for instance represent revenues 
derived from selling advice on a secondary market, where an analyst known to be type G would 
obtain the price u(1). Alternatively, the analyst could be employed on a contract that specified 
wage as a function of reputation.
Traders Following Glosten and Milgrom (1985) a new trader is drawn i.i.d. each period. With 
probability π ∈ (0, 1) the trader is a speculator, and with probability 1 −π he is a liquidity trader. 
Speculators trade to maximize profits, while liquidity traders trade at random, independently of 
all other random variables. To save notation, we assume that liquidity traders buy, sell and abstain 
from trading the asset with probability 1/3 each. The trade order in period t is denoted
yt ∈ {buy, sell, abstain}.
Each speculator is endowed with private information concerning the analyst type. For simplic-
ity, this information takes the form of a binary signal st ∈ {g, b} drawn i.i.d. across speculators 
and satisfying
P(st = g|θ) = γθ , where γG > γB.
Thus st = g (respectively st = b) represents favorable (resp. unfavorable) information about the 
analyst type. We refer to speculators having observed the signal realization g (respectively b) as 
type-g (resp. type-b) speculators.
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Financial market Trade takes place in a competitive dealer market. The public information 
at the beginning of period t is denoted ht , and consists of all past recommendations and trade 
orders, that is, h1 = ∅ and
ht := {r1, ..., rt−1;y1, ..., yt−1}, ∀t > 1.
The current recommendation, rt , is initially observed only by trader t . This assumption is crucial; 
it reflects the fact that recommendations are first disclosed to client investors before they are 
publicized (see Michaely and Womack (2005)).5 The ask price pat and bid price pbt are therefore 
given by
pat =E[V |ht , yt = buy];
pbt =E[V |ht , yt = sell].
That is, competitive market makers price the asset at its expected value.
Strategies and equilibrium The timeline is summarized in Fig. 1. First, the analyst observes 
her type, θ . The remaining timeline, to the right of the broken arrow, is for an arbitrary period t . 
Within a given period, the analyst first observes xt and then issues her recommendation, rt . A new 
trader is then drawn at random (probability π for speculators and 1 −π for liquidity traders). The 
trader observes the current recommendation, and chooses his trade order (to maximize profits if 
he is a speculator, or uniformly at random if he is a liquidity trader). Finally, the trade order and 
the current recommendation are publicly observed, and reputation is updated.
A (behavior) strategy of the B analyst specifies the probabilities of making recommendations 
rt = buyrec and rt = sellrec for all tuples (ht , x1, . . . , xt ). A strategy of speculator t specifies, for 
all triples (ht , rt , st ), the probabilities of buying, selling, and abstaining from trading the asset. 
At the end of each period, the analyst’s reputation is updated using Bayes’ rule. The equilibrium 
concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
2.1. Notation and terminology
Various expectations of the asset value (henceforth referred to as valuations) play a central role 
throughout the analysis. The expected asset value based only on the public history is denoted by 
vt , that is,
vt := E[V |ht ].
As usual in the literature, we slightly abuse terminology and refer to vt as the price. Speculator 
t ’s valuation of the asset is denoted by vt(r, s), that is,6
5 In Rüdiger and Vigier (2017), we show that for a range of the cost of acquiring information, the unique equilibrium 
is such that speculators become informed with probability 1 whereas market makers choose to remain uninformed.
6 If trader t is a liquidity trader then his valuation is irrelevant.
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We will sometimes say that speculators screen the analyst when speculators’ trade orders depend 
on their private signals of the analyst, and that screening breaks down if instead a speculator’s 
trade order is independent of st . Lastly, the expected asset value conditional both on the history 
and the type of the analyst will often be useful; we therefore define
vθt := E[V |ht , θ ].
In particular, vt = ρtvGt + (1 − ρt )vBt .
Since the model is symmetric with respect to buy and sell recommendations, the difference nt
between the total numbers of buy and sell recommendations having occurred before time t will 
be useful in the analysis:
nt :=
∑
k<t
(
1{rk=buyrec} − 1{rk=sellrec}
)
,
where 1X denotes the indicator function of X. We refer to nt as the net recommendation count. 
Some results will be stated for nt positive only in order to shorten the exposition. Lastly, to 
shorten notation the probability of a buy recommendation in the current period conditional on 
the analyst being type θ will be denoted Rθt , that is, Rθt := P(rt = buyrec | ht , θ) = 1 − P(rt =
sellrec | ht , θ).
3. Example: uninformed bad analyst
In this section we illustrate the basic workings of the model by way of a simple example. 
Specifically, we set in this section
qB = 12 ; (A1)
γB = 0 and γG ∈ (0,1); (A2)
u(ρt ) = ρt and δ = 0. (A3)
Assumption (A1) implies that the B analyst is completely uninformed about the realization of 
the asset value. Assumption (A2) implies that st = g perfectly reveals θ = G, while st = b is 
imperfectly informative. Assumption (A3) implies Ut = ρt+1, i.e. each period the objective of 
the B analyst is to maximize the expectation of her reputation one period ahead. The proofs of 
this section are in Appendix A.
We first examine the ordering of speculators’ equilibrium valuations and show that, provided 
the net recommendation count is at least two (nt ≥ 2), then the valuation of speculator t is highest 
when (rt , st ) = (buyrec, g) and lowest when (rt , st ) = (sellrec, b). Furthermore, vt (buyrec, g) is 
strictly above the ask price and vt(sellrec, b) is strictly below the bid price.
Lemma 1. In any equilibrium, given any history satisfying nt ≥ 2:
(i) vt (buyrec, g) = max(r,s){vt (r, s)};
(ii) vt (sellrec, b) = min(r,s){vt (r, s)};
(iii) vt (buyrec, g) > pat and vt (sellrec, b) < pbt .
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the current recommendation, the valuation of type-b speculators is strictly less than the valuation 
of type-g speculators, that is, vt (r, b) < vt(r, g) irrespective of r . The idea is straightforward: 
as B is uninformed, unfavorable information about the analyst draws valuations back toward the 
prior expectation of the asset. Parts (i) and (ii) of the lemma then follow from the remark that buy 
(respectively sell) recommendations tend to push the valuations upwards (resp. downwards).7
To understand the final part of the lemma just note that, due to the presence of liquidity traders, 
speculators with the most extreme valuations of the asset must be making strictly positive profits.
We next present this section’s first main result, showing that if the reputation of the analyst 
is sufficiently high then in equilibrium the market temporarily stops learning anything about the 
type θ of the analyst. In what follows, let vˆt (rt , st ) indicate speculator t ’s valuation of the asset 
under the belief that the B analyst “mimics” type G, that is, given the belief that RBt = RGt . 
Define also
pˆa(ρt , nt ) := πR
G
t
πRGt + 1−π3
(
ρtv
G
t (buyrec) + (1 − ρt )
1
2
)
+
1−π
3
πRGt + 1−π3
(
ρtv
G
t + (1 − ρt )
1
2
)
(1)
and
pˆb(ρt , nt ) := π(1 − R
G
t )
π(1 − RGt ) + 1−π3
(
ρtv
G
t (sellrec) + (1 − ρt )
1
2
)
+
1−π
3
π(1 − RGt ) + 1−π3
(
ρtv
G
t + (1 − ρt )
1
2
)
. (2)
The function pˆa(ρt , nt ) captures the ask price of market makers computed under the assump-
tions that (i) RBt = RGt and (ii) speculator t chooses to buy the asset if and only if rt = buyrec. 
Similarly, the function pˆb(ρt , nt ) captures the bid price under the assumptions that (i) RBt = RGt
and (ii) speculator t chooses to sell the asset if and only if rt = sellrec. We can now define, for 
nt ≥ 2,
ρ(nt ) := min
{
ρt > 0 : vˆt (buyrec, b) ≥ pˆa(ρt , nt ) and vˆt (sellrec, g) ≤ pˆb(ρt , nt )
}
. (3)
We show in Appendix A that ρ(nt ) is well-defined, with ρ(nt ) ∈ (0, 1).8 The interpretation is the 
following: ρ(nt ) is the minimum reputation such that, when RBt = RGt , and the asset is priced at 
pˆa and pˆb, then buying the asset if and only if rt = buyrec and selling the asset if and only if 
rt = sellrec comprises an optimal strategy of speculator t .
Observe that by construction if an equilibrium and history h˜t exist such that ρt > ρ(nt ), 
then an equilibrium exists such that, given h˜t : (i) RBt = RGt , (ii) the asset is priced at pˆa and 
pˆb , and (iii) speculator t buys (respectively sells) the asset if and only if rt = buyrec (resp. 
7 We say “tend to” because the recommendation conveys information about the analyst type, opening up for the possi-
bility that vt (buyrec, b) < vt (sellrec, b). We rule out this possibility in the proof.
8 See Lemma 5 in Appendix A. Note that ρ(nt ) is defined independently of any equilibrium.
312 J. Rüdiger, A. Vigier / Journal of Economic Theory 180 (2019) 304–335rt = sellrec).9 In this equilibrium, given h˜t , neither the recommendation made in period t nor 
the trade order reveals any information about the analyst type; thus ρt+1 = ρt with probability 
one conditional on h˜t . The next proposition shows that in fact, given any equilibrium, if a history 
induces ρt > ρ(nt ) then ρt+1 = ρt with probability one conditional on this history.
Proposition 1. Let ρ(nt ) be defined by (3). Consider an arbitrary equilibrium.
(i) Fix a history ht such that ρt > ρ(nt ), and nt ≥ 2. Then ρt+1 = ρt with probability one.
(ii) Conversely, fix a history ht such that ρt+1 = ρt with probability one, and nt ≥ 2. Then 
ρt ≥ ρ(nt ).
To understand Proposition 1, notice that increasing analyst reputation simultaneously reduces 
the importance of speculators’ private signals about the analyst type and increases the impact 
of the current recommendation on a speculator’s valuation. Hence, when the reputation of the 
analyst is sufficiently high speculators ignore their private signals about the analyst type and 
make trading decisions solely based on the current recommendation. Mimicking the G analyst 
then enables B to completely hide her type, thereby inducing an informational cascade with 
respect to analyst type.
We next inquire whether informational cascades of the kind described above can last indef-
initely. Note to start with that in any equilibrium and given any history, P(rt = rt+1 = · · · =
rt+T = buyrec|ht ) > 0, and so
P(nt+T = nt + T |ht ) > 0, for all T > 0. (4)
Can an equilibrium and history ht exist such that P(ρt+T = ρt |ht ) = 1 for arbitrary T > 0? If 
they existed then, combining (4) with part (ii) of Proposition 1 would imply ρt ≥ ρ(nt + T ), 
for all T > 0. Therefore, if an equilibrium-history pair exists such that P(ρt+T = ρt |ht ) = 1 for 
arbitrary T > 0 then the function ρ(·) must be bounded above by ρt < 1. Our next result shows 
however that limnt→+∞ ρ(nt ) = 1.
Proposition 2. Let ρ(nt ) be defined by (3). Then limnt→+∞ ρ(nt ) = 1. In particular, given any 
equilibrium and history ht , there exists T < ∞ such that P(ρt+T = ρt |ht ) < 1.
We conclude from Proposition 2 that informational cascades of the kind described in Propo-
sition 1 cannot last indefinitely. When the net recommendation count becomes sufficiently large 
relative to the analyst’s reputation, the market again starts accumulating information about the 
type θ of the analyst. The mechanism is as follows. As long as analyst reputation is strictly posi-
tive, increasing the net recommendation count simultaneously reduces the impact of the current 
recommendation on a speculator’s valuation and enhances the importance of beliefs concerning 
the analyst type. Intuitively, since B is uninformed, if the analyst is in fact type B then mispric-
ing must be substantial, allowing speculators to make profits by trading against historical trends 
(that is, selling if the price is high and buying if the price is low). When the net recommendation 
9 Given RBt = RGt , pat = pˆa(ρt , nt ), and pbt = pˆb(ρt , nt ), then ignoring st is optimal for speculator t . On the other 
hand, if speculator t ignores st and reputation is updated based on the belief that RBt = RGt , then the analyst is guaranteed 
ρt+1 = ρt and, therefore, is indifferent between choosing rt = buyrec or choosing rt = sellrec. Lastly, given RBt = RGt
and speculator t buying (respectively selling) the asset if and only if rt = buyrec (resp. rt = sellrec) then the ask price 
(resp. bid price) is given by pˆa(ρt , nt ) (resp. pˆb(ρt , nt )).
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count is sufficiently large speculators thus ignore the current recommendation and make trading 
decisions solely based on their private signals of the analyst type. The former mechanism in turn 
enables the market to gradually learn about θ , yielding this section’s last result.
Proposition 3. In any equilibrium the market learns the analyst type, that is, as t → ∞, with 
probability 1, ρt → 0 conditional on θ = B and ρt → 1 conditional on θ = G.
As we shall see in the next section, the current example’s assumption that the B analyst 
has no information about V is crucial for the result in Proposition 3 to hold. When instead B
is informed, certain conditions enable the recommendations made to never be trumped by the 
speculators’ private signals of the analyst type. Whenever these conditions hold, equilibria in 
which the analyst indefinitely hides her type then exist alongside equilibria in which the market 
learns θ .
We illustrate in Fig. 2 the workings of the model by simulating the model computationally 
over the course of 30 periods.10 In the simulation, the analyst is type B; the parameters cho-
sen are qG = 0.55, γG = 0.7, π = 0.3, and ρ1 = 0.25. The solid curve in the figure represents 
the reputation of the analyst; the dashed curve shows the evolution of the screening threshold 
ρ(nt ). The periods in which screening breaks down thus correspond to the periods in which the 
solid curve lies above the dashed curve. The dotted curve depicts the price vt , with red squares 
representing rt = buyrec and blue triangles representing rt = sellrec.
Since ρ1 < ρ(n1), initially speculators screen the analyst. At first, the analyst experiences 
a streak of luck: for the first 5 periods, trade orders are in line with the recommendations and 
therefore the reputation goes up. By period 6, the market attaches 91% probability to the ana-
lyst being type G (ρ6 = 0.91). At this point, the impact of the recommendations on the price is 
substantial: 4 buy and 1 sell recommendations give v6 = 0.63. Next period, ρ7 > ρ(n7), spec-
ulators’ screening of the analyst breaks down and reputation momentarily stops evolving. By 
period 12, a string of buy recommendations pushes the screening threshold above the reputation, 
allowing once again the market to evaluate the analyst’s ability. However, another lucky event 
enables the analyst to increase her reputation, triggering a new breakdown of screening starting 
10 We explain the simulation in Appendix D (available online). The code of the simulation is available on the authors’ 
websites.
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sequence of trade orders goes counter to the recommendations made and reputation therefore 
decreases. From period 20 on, the analyst only makes buy recommendations, but at this point her 
reputation has dropped so much that she has a limited impact on the price. Eventually, her buy 
recommendations become insufficient to move the price away from the prior.
4. General results
In this section we present the paper’s main results. Throughout this section we will say that 
the market learns the analyst type (respectively learns the true asset value) if, as t → ∞, with 
probability 1, ρt → 0 conditional on θ = B (resp. vt → 0 conditional on V = 0) and ρt → 1
conditional on θ = G (resp. vt → 1 conditional on V = 1). The proofs of this section are in 
Appendix B.
Can the B analyst manipulate the market in order to hide her type and what are the implica-
tions for price discovery (i.e. for the convergence of the price to the true asset value)? We start 
with a positive result, in the sense that if the B analyst successfully hides her type then it must 
be that the market learns the true asset value.
Theorem 1. In any equilibrium, either the market learns the true asset value or the market learns 
the analyst type.
The logic of the theorem is the following. In order to successfully hide her type, B needs 
screening to break down, that is, B requires speculators to follow the recommendations irrespec-
tive of their type. In other words, to hide her type, B needs to make recommendations worth 
listening to. But in that case the recommendations of both types of the analyst are informative, 
and so as t → ∞ the price must converge to the true asset value.
We provide in the next paragraph some details of the proof of Theorem 1 which help to shed 
light on the rest of the analysis. By virtue of the law of large numbers, conditional on θ = G
the frequency of buy recommendations must converge either to qG or to 1 − qG. Hence, either 
B makes buy recommendations with frequency qG or 1 − qG, or B is discovered. We will say 
that “B mimics G” in the former case. Next suppose that B does indeed mimic G and makes 
buy recommendations with frequency qG. Then since qG > 12 the net recommendation count, nt , 
must tend to infinity as t → ∞. The valuation conditional on θ = G therefore converges to 1. 
Imagine now that B’s recommendations lost their informativeness in the limit as t → ∞ and that 
the valuation conditional on θ = B therefore did not converge to 1. Then, choosing t sufficiently 
large, the valuation vt (r, b) of a type-b speculator sharply reverts toward the prior. In other words, 
as t → ∞ type-b speculators trade against historical trends, selling the asset when the price is 
high and buying the asset when the price is low. But then speculators of types g and b trade 
in opposite directions, implying efficient screening in the limit as t → ∞.11 Hence, either B’s 
recommendations remain informative forever or the market eventually learns the analyst type.
The next definition formalizes the idea of B’s recommendations losing informativeness in the 
limit as t → ∞.
11 This generalizes our observation in the example of Section 3. There, valuations conditional on θ = B were equal to 
1
.2
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P(rt = buyrec|V = 1, ht ,B) − P(rt = buyrec|V = 0, ht ,B) →
t→∞ 0.
Say that an equilibrium is class U if in the equilibrium considered B’s strategy is asymptotically 
uninformative.
We can now state the following result.
Proposition 4. A class-U equilibrium exists for all parameter values.
The existence of class-U equilibria is easy to show. For all values of qB , an equilibrium can 
always be constructed in which B’s recommendations are independent of V and where, for any 
history ht , B recommends buy/sell according to the probabilities of an equilibrium corresponding 
to qB = 12 .13 The following corollary is a consequence of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. In all class-U equilibria the market learns the analyst type.
Note that qB = 12 implies that all equilibria are class-U equilibria. So Proposition 3 of the 
previous Section immediately follows from Corollary 1.
Combining Proposition 4 and Corollary 1 shows existence of equilibria such that the market 
learns the analyst type. We next inquire: can an equilibrium exist in which the B analyst succeeds 
at hiding her type forever, that is, in which the market does not learn the analyst type? The next 
theorem shows that as long as (i) the B analyst possesses some private information about the asset 
and (ii) no speculator is too well informed about the analyst type, then an equilibrium exists in 
which the market learns nothing about θ .
Theorem 2. Suppose qB > 12 and γG ∈ (0, 1). There exists η > 0 such that, if γB > γG − η, then 
an equilibrium exists in which P(ρt = ρ1) = 1 irrespective of t .
The existence of an equilibrium in which B successfully hides her type is, in our opinion, a 
relatively surprising result. Here is why. We argued earlier in this section that if B’s recommen-
dations lost their informativeness in the limit as t → ∞ then the valuations of type-b speculators 
would eventually sharply revert toward the prior, and induce type-b speculators to trade against 
historical trends. Suppose now for the sake of argument that instead of losing their informative-
ness, B’s recommendations became maximally informative, i.e. suppose B stopped lying. In that 
case, since qG > qB , then B would reveal herself statistically over the course of time through 
her recommendations. What the theorem demonstrates is the possibility for B to strike a balance 
between garbling her recommendations sufficiently so as to avoid revealing herself statistically, 
while at the same time making the recommendations sufficiently informative so as to ensure that 
they are never trumped by the speculators’ private signals of the analyst type.
Applying Theorem 1 to any equilibrium satisfying the condition stated in Theorem 2 shows 
that the market must learn the true asset value. The caveat however is that, to appear like she is 
type G, the B analyst artificially autocorrelates the recommendations she makes. By garbling her 
12 That is, for any outcome in the underlying probability space.
13 Existence of an equilibrium is assured by Lemma 11 in Appendix E (available online).
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this important remark in the simulations of the next section.
We close this section with a brief discussion of the assumption that the G analyst makes 
truthful recommendations. Note first that if G were strategic then Theorem 1 would not be true. 
For a counterexample, consider a pure babbling equilibrium in which neither type of the analyst 
ever makes recommendations that are correlated with V . A pure babbling equilibrium is easily 
constructed in which the market neither learns the true asset value nor the analyst type.14 In 
contrast, Theorem 2 remains true when G is strategic. The logic is straightforward. If the market 
accumulates no information about the analyst type when beliefs are such that G makes truthful 
recommendations then making truthful recommendations each period is an optimal strategy of 
the G analyst.
5. Market liquidity and price discovery
In this section we examine the model’s implications regarding market liquidity and price 
discovery, and propose two benchmarks for comparative purposes. We first analyze the evolution 
of reputation, and then show how reputation affects market learning about asset values.
We focus in the simulations of this section on the example analyzed in Section 3, given by 
qB = 12 , γB = 0, u(ρt ) = ρt and δ = 0. The other parameters are chosen as follows: ρ1 = 0.4, 
qG = 0.7, γG = 0.7, and π = 0.3. All simulation results in this section show average values over 
30000 simulations.15
Two factors deter learning in our model: (i) the breakdown of screening by speculators and 
(ii) B’s strategic attempt to appear like she is type G. To gain insights into their respective 
importance, we compare the model of this paper (henceforth referred to as the baseline model) 
to two benchmarks, described below.
The no-breakdown model In this model, the trade order yt is unobserved. Public learning about 
the analyst type occurs through i.i.d. draws from probability distributions matching those of the 
trade order in the baseline model under efficient screening.16 Thus, screening is constant in this 
model and breakdowns never occur. Notice that B’s optimal strategy in this case is to mimic G
in all periods, that is, to make recommendations satisfying P(rt = buyrec | ht , θ = B) = P(rt =
buyrec | ht , θ = G).
The non-strategic model In this model the B analyst behaves non-strategically, truthfully rec-
ommending rt = xt in all periods. Since B’s signal xt is uninformative and xt is i.i.d., then xt
is uniformly distributed. As a consequence, B sends out a buy/sell recommendation with equal 
probability each period.
14 A pure babbling equilibrium can also be constructed in which although the market does not learn V , the market learns 
θ .
15 The code for the simulations is available at the authors’ websites. In Appendix D (available online) we describe in 
detail the simulation algorithm.
16 I.e. the trade order probability distribution in the baseline model when, fixing rt , the support of speculator t ’s strategy 
conditional on st = b does not intersect the support of his strategy conditional on st = g.
J. Rüdiger, A. Vigier / Journal of Economic Theory 180 (2019) 304–335 317Fig. 3. Reputation of B analyst.
5.1. Reputation
We compare in Fig. 3 the evolution of the analyst’s reputation in the baseline model to that 
obtained in the benchmarks. The simulations of the figure are for θ = B . The solid curve corre-
sponds to the baseline model, the dashed curve to the no-breakdown model and the dotted curve 
to the non-strategic model. The solid curve lies above the other curves, reflecting slower learning 
in the baseline model relative to the benchmarks. This is unsurprising since each benchmark was 
constructed so as to switch off one of the factors impeding learning in the baseline model.
Screening breaks down at t = 1 in both the baseline model and the non-strategic model, giv-
ing ρ2 = ρ1. By contrast, ρ2 < ρ1 in the no-breakdown model since the market in that case 
accumulates each period information about the analyst. Initially, learning is therefore fastest in 
the no-breakdown model. As time passes and reputation decreases, screening breakdowns grad-
ually cease to occur in the baseline model (see Proposition 1).17 The dashed and solid curves 
therefore converge towards one another. In sharp contrast the solid and dotted curves diverge. In-
tuitively, the greater the number of past recommendations the more conspicuous the absence of 
autocorrelation in recommendations made by the non-strategic B analyst. The dashed and dotted 
curves therefore cross at t = 13, after which point reputation is lowest in the non-strategic model.
5.2. Spread
The spread, defined as pat − pbt , provides a widely used measure of market liquidity. We now 
examine how the reputation affects the spread over time. There are two closely related ways of 
interpreting the spread. One may view the spread as a measure of (minus) the expected utility of 
a liquidity trader, and one may view the spread as a measure of adverse selection facing market 
makers. In either case, it provides a measure of the market’s information about the asset value at 
any given point in time.
We show in Fig. 4 the evolution of the spread.18 The first remark, which captures a central fea-
ture, is that the spread increases at first and decreases eventually. This pattern can be traced back 
17 In the baseline model screening breaks down on average 34% of the time in the first 5 periods, and on average 10% 
of the time over the first 20 periods.
18 In the figure the average is taken as ρ1 times the average spread conditional on θ = G plus 1 − ρ1 times the average 
spread conditional on θ = B .
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to the structure of asymmetric information between speculators and market makers in our model. 
In each period, a speculator possesses private information about the analyst type (in the form of 
the signal st ) and private information about the asset (the latest recommendation). The greater the 
number of past recommendations the more important st , and therefore the spread grows initially, 
as the accumulation of recommendations makes the speculators’ private signals of the analyst 
type more valuable. This is unlike traditional sequential trade models, where more information 
always tends to decrease spreads. However, by virtue of Corollary 1, the market eventually learns 
the analyst type. Asymmetric information between speculators and market makers therefore dis-
appears as t tends to infinity.
Our second observation is that the difference between spreads in the baseline and non-
strategic models remains significant even past t = 50. This remark reflects two things. First, 
as we emphasized in the previous subsection learning about the analyst type is much quicker 
in the non-strategic model than in the baseline model. Second, the non-strategic model implies 
P(rt = buyrec | ht , θ = B) = 12 . The average net recommendation count conditional on θ = B
therefore remains close to 0 irrespective of t , which in turns lowers the importance of specula-
tors’ private information about the analyst type. Combining the two effects creates a substantial 
difference between adverse selection in the baseline and non-strategic models.
5.3. Squared price error
We now discuss the pattern of the squared price error, defined as (vt − V )2 and traditionally 
used as a measure of (inverse) price discovery.19
We show in Fig. 5 the evolution of the squared price error. First, notice that the squared price 
error does not increase initially in the same manner as the spread. Recall that the spread increases 
initially as the accumulation of recommendations implies that the speculator’s private signal st
becomes more important, and adverse selection therefore drives up the spread. To see why the 
squared price error is not subject to the same effect, we first remark that the squared price error 
combines information contained in quotes with information contained in trade orders. Consider 
19 Since in the simulations qB = 12 , that is to say B is uninformed, the squared price error is taken to be (vt − 1/2)2
whenever θ = B . In Fig. 5 the average is taken as ρ1 times the average squared price error conditional on θ = G plus 
1 − ρ1 times squared price error conditional on θ = B .
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now what happens when the accumulation of recommendations causes the spread to increase 
through the aforementioned effect. In isolation, the higher spread implies that quotes are farther 
away from the expected asset value, affecting price discovery negatively (increase the squared 
price error). However, trade orders also become more informative, as the speculator now has 
better information. The latter effect affects price discovery positively (decrease the squared price 
error). The combined effect is that the squared price error decreases over time, and therefore we 
do not observe an initial ‘hump’ in squared price error in the same manner that we observed an 
initial hump in the spread.
Second, observe the substantial difference of squared price error in the baseline model and 
in the non-strategic model. Comparatively, the no-breakdown model is far closer to the baseline 
model. This is line with the observations from Subsection 5.1, where the same effect was identi-
fied for the spread. These observations suggest that in the baseline model the greatest impediment 
to learning the true asset value is B’s strategic behavior.
Lastly, we relate our results to the literature on the speed of learning in observational learn-
ing models. Vives (1993, 1995) shows that price adjustment in financial markets may be slow, 
but that this process is made faster by market makers who, by setting competitive prices, pro-
vide incentives for traders to use and therefore reveal their private information. However, Vives 
(2010) remarks that herding may lead market makers to update prices only very slowly, due to 
uncertainty about the informativeness of the trade orders. Our model differs from the models con-
sidered in the literature on the speed of observational learning in that the quality of the traders’ 
information is uncertain and endogenous, via the strategic incentives of the B analyst. Screening 
breakdowns may slow down learning in the same manner that herding may slow down learning 
in the aforementioned models.
6. Changing fundamentals
In this section we extend the model by allowing the underlying asset value Vt to change over 
time. We saw through Proposition 3 that in the baseline model, for qB = 12 , the market learns the 
analyst type in any equilibrium. We now show that with changing asset values even a completely 
uninformed B analyst can hide her type indefinitely. The proofs of this section are in Appendix C.
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γB = 0 and γG ∈ (0, 1), u(ρt ) = ρt and δ = 0. However, we assume that {Vt}∞t=1 follows a 
commonly known Markov process with transition matrix
0 1
0 1 − z2 z2
1 z2 1 − z2
where z ∈ [0, 1]. The idea is as follows. Each period, a new draw is made with probability z; 
each new draw is such that Vt equals 0 or 1 with probability 12 each. With probability 1 − z this 
period’s value equals last period’s value. The total probability that the value in a period equals 
the value in the previous period is thus equal to 1 − z2 . The baseline model corresponds to z = 0. 
We can now state this section’s main result.
Proposition 5. For all z > 0, there exists ρ < 1 such that, in equilibrium, if ρt > ρ then P(ρs =
ρt ) = 1 for all s > t .
We saw in Section 3 that with a fixed asset value informational cascades of the kind uncovered 
in Proposition 1 had to be transitory. The argument relied on the observation that increasing the 
net recommendation count simultaneously reduced the impact of the current recommendation on 
a speculator’s valuation and raised the importance of beliefs concerning the analyst’s true type. 
When the net recommendation count became sufficiently large speculators thus started ignoring 
the current recommendation and made trading decisions solely based on their private signals of 
the analyst type. The logic of Proposition 5 is straightforward: a changing asset value ensures that 
the marginal information incorporated in the recommendations of the G analyst never vanishes, 
even as nt tends to infinity. Once reputation is sufficiently high mimicking G then allows B to 
hide her type infinitely long, in a way similar to the mechanism highlighted in connection to 
Proposition 1.
Interestingly, since our model exhibits twofold uncertainty (with respect to the asset value 
and with respect to analyst ability) here changing fundamentals facilitate the occurrence of in-
formational cascades with respect to analyst ability. These insights naturally complement those 
of Moscarini et al. (1998) concerning the fragility of informational cascades in a changing en-
vironment:20 In our setting, if the type of the analyst evolved instead of the asset value then 
speculators’ screening of the analyst would not cease, since the screening threshold ρ(nt ) from 
Proposition 1 would then never be reached.21
7. Concluding remarks
There is ample evidence that analyst recommendations influence stock prices, and high-
reputation analysts have greater impact than low-reputation analysts (Stickel, 1995; Womack, 
1996; Leone and Wu, 2007; Loh and Stulz, 2011; Fang and Yasuda, 2014). The question re-
mains as to whether fund managers and investors actually learn analyst ability over time. If 
price movements are effectively dictated by star analysts then evaluating their true ability be-
comes a complicated task. Fang and Yasuda (2014) for instance document that being elected 
20 In Moscarini et al. (1998) the state of the world changes stochastically over time. The resulting information depreci-
ation implies that, in their setting, only temporary informational cascades can arise.
21 We thank an associate editor for this insightful remark.
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likelihood of being elected. In our model, fundamental asset values are never observed. Traders’ 
private information about the analyst is backed out from the order flow. An endogeneity problem 
thus arises. An equilibrium in which the market learns the analyst type always exists. However, 
under certain conditions, an equilibrium exists in which the incompetent analyst succeeds at 
hiding her type indefinitely: each trader ignores his own private information and ‘herds’ on the 
analyst’s recommendations. Moreover, the incompetent analyst may be able to momentarily hide 
her type even in the equilibria where the market eventually learns the analyst type. These results 
are broadly consistent with empirical evidence. For example, Brown et al. (2013) find that mutual 
funds often herd in the direction of analyst recommendation changes, and that the stocks later 
tend to underperform.22 In a similar vein, several papers document ‘self-fulfilling prophecies’ in 
connection to analyst recommendations publicized in the mass media (Sant and Zaman, 1996; 
Keasler and McNeil, 2010).23
Appendix A. Proofs of Section 3
The following notation and terminology will help the exposition of the proofs. Define
vθt (r) := E[V |ht , rt = r, θ ].
Let ρt (r, s) denote the probability assigned by speculator t to θ = G. Assumptions (A1)–(A2)
imply
vBt (buyrec) = vBt (sellrec) = vBt =
1
2
, (5)
ρt (buyrec, g) = ρt (sellrec, g) = 1, (6)
ρt (buyrec, b) = ρt (1 − γG)R
G
t
ρt (1 − γG)RGt + (1 − ρt )RBt
, (7)
ρt (sellrec, b) = ρt (1 − γG)(1 − R
G
t )
ρt (1 − γG)(1 − RGt ) + (1 − ρt )(1 − RBt )
. (8)
Lemma 2. In equilibrium, if RBt > RGt then either vt (buyrec, b) = pbt , or vt (buyrec, g) > pat
implies vt (buyrec, b) ≥ pat .
Proof. Consider an arbitrary equilibrium and fix a history ht . To shorten notation, hence-
forth all probabilities and expectations will be understood conditional on ht . For all (y, r) ∈
{buy, sell, abstain} × {buyrec, sellrec}, let L(y|r) denote the likelihood ratio of trade order y
given recommendation r , that is,
L(y|r) := P(yt = y|rt = r, θ = G)
P(yt = y|rt = r, θ = B) .
22 As stated in the paper, “...we find clear evidence that mutual funds herd on analyst recommendation changes, and that 
this trading impacts stock prices in a manner consistent with overreaction by funds to the consensus signal provided by 
analysts”.
23 Sant and Zaman focus on stocks mentioned in Business Week’s ‘Inside Wall Street’ column. This column mainly 
includes quotes from analysts, but also from investment company managers and other financial market agents. Keasler 
and McNeil examine the recommendations of Jim Cramer in the CNBC show ‘Mad Money’.
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Eyt [L(yt |r)|r,B] = 1. (9)
Define f (x) := ρt x
ρt x+(1−ρt ) , noting that f (·) is increasing and concave. Moreover, applying 
Bayes’ rule,
E[ρt+1|rt = buyrec, θ = B] = Eyt
[
f
(RGt
RBt
L(yt |buyrec)
)∣∣∣rt = buyrec, θ = B] (10)
and
E[ρt+1|rt = sellrec, θ = B] = Eyt
[
f
(1 − RGt
1 − RBt
L(yt |sellrec)
)∣∣∣rt = sellrec, θ = B]. (11)
Assume henceforth that in the equilibrium considered vt (buyrec, b) 
= pbt , RBt > RGt
and vt (buyrec, g) > pat . We aim to show that vt (buyrec, b) ≥ pat . Suppose instead that 
vt (buyrec, b) < pat . Then vt (buyrec, g) > pat > vt (buyrec, b), that is, conditional on a buy rec-
ommendation, type-g (respectively type-b) speculators buy the asset with probability 1 (resp. 0). 
As vt (buyrec, b) 
= pbt , conditioning on rt = buyrec and θ = B the random variable L(yt |buyrec)
has support{ 1−π
3 + π(1 − γG)
1−π
3 + π
, 1 ,
1−π
3 + πγG
1−π
3
}
and satisfies P(L(yt |buyrec) = 1|rt = buyrec, B) = 1−π3 . Now, conditioning instead on rt =
sellrec and θ = B , either L(yt |sellrec) is distributed as above or L(yt |sellrec) is equal to 1 
with probability 1.25 Combined with (9) the previous remarks imply that the distribution of 
L(yt |buyrec) conditional on rt = buyrec and θ = B is a mean-preserving spread of the distri-
bution of L(yt |sellrec) conditional on rt = sellrec and θ = B; call this remark R1.
Next,
E[ρt+1|rt = buyrec, θ = B] = E
[
f
(RGt
RBt
L(yt |buyrec)
)∣∣∣rt = buyrec, θ = B]
< E
[
f
(1 − RGt
1 − RBt
L(yt |buyrec)
)∣∣∣rt = buyrec, θ = B]
≤ E
[
f
(1 − RGt
1 − RBt
L(yt |sellrec)
)∣∣∣rt = sellrec, θ = B]
= E[ρt+1|rt = sellrec, θ = B].
The first equality is obtained from (10); the first inequality is due to f (·) being increasing and 
RBt > R
G
t ; the second inequality follows from remark R1 and concavity of f (·); the last equality 
is obtained from (11).
24 We write Eyt to indicate that the expectation is with respect to yt .
25 We ignore for simplicity the knife-edge cases in which, conditional on a sell recommendation, one type of speculator 
is indifferent between two trade orders. These cases lead to the same conclusion since the pattern of trade induced by a 
buy recommendation reveals the maximum possible amount of information about θ .
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buyrec, θ = B], that is, the expected payoff of the B analyst is strictly greater for a sell rec-
ommendation than it is for a buy recommendation. Equilibrium consistency therefore requires 
RBt = 0, contradicting the initial assumption that RBt > RGt . Hence, either vt (buyrec, b) = pbt , or 
RBt > R
G
t and vt (buyrec, g) > pat imply vt (buyrec, b) ≥ pat . 
Proof of Lemma 1. First notice that since (i) qG < 1 and (ii) liquidity traders uniformly ran-
domize over actions, then in any equilibrium and given any history, ρt ∈ (0, 1). Consider an 
arbitrary equilibrium and fix a history ht with nt ≥ 2. Because the net recommendation count is 
at least two,
vGt (buyrec) > vGt (sellrec) >
1
2
. (12)
Furthermore, as vBt (r) = 12 irrespective of r ,
vt (r, s) = ρt (r, s)vGt (r) +
(
1 − ρt (r, s)
)
vBt (r) = ρt (r, s)vGt (r) +
(
1 − ρt (r, s)
)1
2
(13)
for all (r, s) ∈ {buyrec, sellrec} × {g, b}. As ρt (r, g) = 1 irrespective of r , (12) and (13) give 
vt (r, g) = vGt (r) and vt (buyrec, g) = max(r,s){vt (r, s)}, establishing part (i) of the lemma.
We next show pat > vt > pbt . We have vt (buyrec, g) > vt . Thus pat > vt . Suppose for a con-
tradiction that pbt = vt . By virtue of the law of total expectation,
vt = P(yt = sell|ht )pbt + P(yt = abstain|ht )E[V |ht , yt = abstain] + P(yt = buy|ht )pat .
Therefore, as pat > vt , we must have E[V |ht , yt = abstain] < vt . Observe that if only liquidity 
traders abstained we would have E[V |ht , yt = abstain] = vt . So speculator t must abstain in 
some contingency (r, s) such that vt (r, s) < pbt . This is evidently impossible in equilibrium. 
Hence pbt < vt .
We can now show part (ii) of the lemma. Using (12) and (13) gives
vt (sellrec, b) = ρt (sellrec, b)vGt (sellrec) +
(
1 − ρt (sellrec, b)
)1
2
≤ vGt (sellrec)
= vt (sellrec, g).
Hence, by part (i) of the lemma,
vt (sellrec, b) = min
(r,s)
{vt (r, s)} ⇔ vt (sellrec, b) ≤ vt (buyrec, b). (14)
Suppose vt (sellrec, b) > vt(buyrec, b) (and therefore vt (buyrec, b) = min(r,s){vt (r, s)}). The 
combination of (12) and (13) then gives ρt (sellrec, b) > ρt(buyrec, b) which, using (7)–(8), 
implies RBt > RGt . On the other hand, since we established that pbt < vt , vt (buyrec, b) =
min(r,s){vt (r, s)} implies vt (buyrec, b) < pbt . Gathering the previous remarks gives (a) RBt > RGt
on the one hand and (b) vt (buyrec, b) < pbt < pat < vt (buyrec, g) on the other. We saw in 
Lemma 2 that (a) and (b) cannot hold at once. Hence vt (sellrec, b) ≤ vt (buyrec, b) and, by (14), 
vt (sellrec, b) = min(r,s){vt (r, s)}, establishing part (ii) of the lemma. 
Lemma 3. Let ρt ∈ (0, 1). In equilibrium, RBt < RGt implies
min{vt (buyrec, b), vt (buyrec, g)} ≤ pat .
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tion, all expectations will be understood conditional on ht .
Suppose RBt < RGt and min{vt (buyrec, b), vt (buyrec, g)} > pat . The latter inequality implies 
that there is no screening following a buy recommendation. Hence following a buy recom-
mendation the only public information about θ comes from the recommendation itself. As 
RBt < R
G
t , we obtain E[ρt+1|rt = buyrec, θ = B] > ρt . However, conditional on θ = B , ρt is 
a super-martingale. Hence E[ρt+1|rt = sellrec, θ = B] < ρt . Equilibrium consistency thus re-
quires RBt = 1, contradicting the assumption that RBt < RGt . 
Lemma 4. Let ρt ∈ (0, 1). In equilibrium, RBt > RGt implies
max{vt (sellrec, b), vt (sellrec, g)} ≥ pbt .
Proof. Lemma 4 is the mirror image of Lemma 3. Their proofs are almost identical. We do not 
repeat the details. 
Lemma 5. Fix nt ≥ 2. Let vˆt (r, s) denote speculator t ’s valuation of the asset given the belief 
that RBt = RGt . Then{
ρt > 0 : vˆt (buyrec, b) ≥ pˆa(ρt , nt ) and vˆt (sellrec, g) ≤ pˆb(ρt , nt )
}= {ρt : ρt ≥ ρ(nt )},
with pˆa(ρt , nt ), pˆb(ρt , nt ) and ρ(nt ) defined by (1), (2) and (3), respectively. Moreover, ρ(nt ) ∈
(0, 1).
Proof. The lemma follows from noting that (i) vˆt (buyrec, b) − pˆa(ρt , nt ) is concave in ρt , 
strictly greater than 0 at ρt = 1 and equal to 0 at ρt = 0, and (ii) pˆb(ρt , nt ) − vˆt (sellrec, g)
is linear in ρt and strictly greater than 0 at ρt = 1. 
Proof of Proposition 1. We prove first part (ii) of the proposition. Consider an arbitrary equi-
librium, and a history ht such that nt ≥ 2 and P(ρt+1 = ρt |ht ) = 1. Then RBt = RGt , otherwise 
the market would learn about θ from observing rt at the beginning of period t + 1. Similarly, 
speculator t ’s trade order cannot reveal anything about st . We know by part (iii) of Lemma 1 that 
speculator t buys with probability 1 conditional on (rt , st ) = (buyrec, g) and sells with probabil-
ity 1 conditional on (rt , st ) = (sellrec, b). So speculator t must buy with probability 1 conditional 
on rt = buyrec and sell with probability 1 conditional on rt = sellrec. The previous remarks in 
turn imply pat = pˆa(ρt , nt ) and pbt = pˆb(ρt , nt ).26 Now, buying the asset is optimal for specu-
lator t conditional on (rt , st ) = (buyrec, b), giving vˆt (buyrec, b) ≥ pˆa(ρt , nt ). Similarly, selling 
the asset is optimal conditional on (rt , st ) = (sellrec, g), giving vˆt (sellrec, g) ≤ pˆb(ρt , nt ). Hence 
ρt ∈
{
ρt > 0 : vˆt (buyrec, b) ≥ pˆa(ρt , nt ) and vˆt (sellrec, g) ≤ pˆb(ρt , nt )
}
. Lemma 5 concludes 
the proof of part (ii) of the proposition.
We now prove part (i) of the proposition. Consider an arbitrary equilibrium, and a history ht
such that nt ≥ 2 and ρt > ρ(nt ). First, we claim that RBt = RGt . Suppose for a contradiction that 
RBt < R
G
t . Then,
26 Recall, the function pˆa(ρt , nt ) captures the ask price of market makers computed under the assumptions that (i) 
RBt = RGt and (ii) speculator t chooses to buy the asset if and only if rt = buyrec. Similarly, the function pˆb(ρt , nt )
captures the bid price under the assumptions that (i) RBt = RGt and (ii) speculator t chooses to sell the asset if and only 
if rt = sellrec.
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⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
vt (buyrec, g) = vˆt (buyrec, g)
vt (buyrec, b) > vˆt (buyrec, b)
vt (sellrec, g) = vˆt (sellrec, g)
vt (sellrec, b) < vˆt (sellrec, b).
Now, observe first that ρt > ρ(nt ) combined with Lemma 1 yields vt (sellrec, b) <
vt(sellrec, g) = vˆt (sellrec, g) < pˆb(ρt , nt ) < vt < pat . Hence in the equilibrium considered 
speculator t never buys the asset conditional on rt = sellrec. Second, ρt > ρ(nt ) implies that 
vˆt (buyrec, b) is strictly greater than the weighted average of vˆt (buyrec, g) and vt .27 Since 
vt (buyrec, b) > vˆt (buyrec, b), we therefore obtain vt (buyrec, b) > pat . Thus, by Lemma 1,
min{vt (buyrec, b), vt (buyrec, g)} > pat . (15)
But (15) contradicts Lemma 3.
Similarly, suppose for a contradiction that RBt > RGt . Then,⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
vt (buyrec, g) = vˆt (buyrec, g)
vt (buyrec, b) < vˆt (buyrec, b)
vt (sellrec, g) = vˆt (sellrec, g)
vt (sellrec, b) > vˆt (sellrec, b).
Moreover, Lemma 2 gives vt (buyrec, b) ≥ pbt , so neither vt (buyrec, b) nor vt (buyrec, g) af-
fect the bid price. Now, ρt > ρ(nt ) implies that vˆt (sellrec, g) is strictly less than the weighted 
average of vˆt (sellrec, b) and vt .28 Since vt (sellrec, b) > vˆt (sellrec, b), we therefore obtain 
vt (sellrec, g) < pbt . Thus, by Lemma 1,
max{vt (sellrec, b), vt (sellrec, g)} < pbt . (16)
But (16) contradicts Lemma 4. The previous steps establish the claim that RBt = RGt .
Finally, repeating the remarks made above, ρt > ρ(nt ) implies (i) vˆt (buyrec, b) is strictly 
greater than the weighted average of vˆt (buyrec, g) and vt , and (ii) vˆt (sellrec, g) is strictly 
less than the weighted average of vˆt (sellrec, b) and vt . Therefore vˆt (buyrec, b) > pat and 
vˆt (sellrec, g) < pbt , giving P(ρt+1 = ρt |ht ) = 1 and concluding the proof of part (i) of the propo-
sition. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Fix ρt < 1. Then, choosing nt sufficiently large:
vt (sellrec, g) = vGt (sellrec) > ρtvGt + (1 − ρt )
1
2
= vt ≥ pbt > vt (sellrec, b). (17)
For the first inequality notice that ρt < 1 and lim
nt→+∞
vGt = lim
nt→+∞
vGt (sellrec) = 1; the second 
inequality follows from standard arguments, and the third inequality is by part (iii) of Lemma 1.
On the other hand, by (3), ρt ≥ ρ(nt ) implies
vt (sellrec, g) = vˆt (sellrec, g) ≤ pˆb(ρt , nt ) ≤ vt .
27 With weights πρt γGRGt and 1−π3 , respectively.
28 With weights π
(
ρt (1 − γG) + (1 − ρt )
)
(1 − RGt ) and 1−π , respectively.3
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we obtain limnt→+∞ ρ(nt ) = 1. 
Proof of Proposition 3. The proposition follows from Corollary 1 once we note that for qB = 12
all equilibria are class-U equilibria. 
Appendix B. Proofs of Section 4
We make use throughout this appendix of the additional notation and terminology defined at 
the start of Appendix A. We will say with a slight abuse of terminology that a strategy of the B
analyst is a non-degenerate mixed strategy if P(rt = r|ht , θ = B) ∈ (0, 1) for all public histories 
ht .
29
Lemma 6. Any equilibrium strategy of the B analyst is a non-degenerate mixed strategy.
Proof. Consider a strategy of the B analyst such that for some ht and r , P(rt = r|ht , θ = B) = 0. 
Then applying Bayes’ rule, given history ht , the recommendation rt = r induces ρt+1 = 1
whereas rt 
= r induces ρt+1 < 1 (recall, qG < 1, therefore each period the G analyst makes 
both recommendations with positive probabilities). Hence, the strategy considered cannot be an 
equilibrium strategy. 
Lemma 7. For any non-degenerate mixed strategy of the B analyst, P( lim
t→∞ρt = 1|θ = B) = 0
and P( lim
t→∞ρt = 0|θ = G) = 0. Similarly, P( limt→∞vt = 1|V = 0) = 0 and P( limt→∞vt = 0|
V = 1) = 0.
Proof. We prove here the first part of the lemma; the proof of the second part is analogous. Con-
sider an arbitrary non-degenerate mixed strategy of the B analyst. Reputation, being a bounded 
martingale, converges with probability 1. Let ρ := lim
t→∞ρt . Then
E
[ ρt+1
1 − ρt+1
∣∣∣B]= E[ ∑
rt+1,yt+1
P(rt+1, yt+1|ht ,B) · ρtP(rt+1, yt+1|ht ,G)
(1 − ρt )P(rt+1, yt+1|ht ,B)
∣∣∣∣B
]
= E
[
ρt
1 − ρt
∑
rt+1,yt+1
P(rt+1, yt+1|ht ,G)
∣∣∣∣B
]
= E
[ ρt
1 − ρt
∣∣∣B].
Hence, E
[
ρt
1−ρt
∣∣∣B] = ρ11−ρ1 . Fatou’s Lemma then gives E
[
ρ
1−ρ
∣∣∣B] ≤ ρ11−ρ1 . This shows P(ρ =
1|B) = 0. Similar derivations show P(ρ = 0|G) = 0. 
Proof of Theorem 1. Consider an arbitrary equilibrium. We will show that, with probability 1, 
either
29 We are slightly abusing terminology since a strategy of the B analyst could also depend on what she observed 
privately up to period t , namely x1, . . . , xt .
J. Rüdiger, A. Vigier / Journal of Economic Theory 180 (2019) 304–335 327lim
t→∞vt = V, (18)
or
ρ := lim
t→∞ρt ∈ {0,1}. (19)
In case (19) holds, applying Lemma 7 gives ρ = 0 conditional on θ = B and ρ = 1 conditional 
on θ = G. So showing that at least one of (18) and (19) has to hold is sufficient to prove the 
theorem.
For any history ht , let mt denote the number of buy recommendations up to period t . By virtue 
of the law of large numbers:
lim
t→∞
mt
t
∈ {qG,1 − qG} (20)
with probability 1 conditional on θ = G. Hence, either property (20) holds as well with proba-
bility 1 conditional on θ = B or whenever (20) does not hold then applying Bayes’ rule gives 
lim
t→∞ρt = 0 (in which case (19) evidently holds). We therefore restrict attention in the rest of the 
proof to the set of outcomes such that (20) holds.
Suppose for concreteness that lim
t→∞
mt
t
= qG (the other case is symmetric), so that lim
t→∞v
G
t = 1. 
If lim
t→∞v
B
t = 1 then limt→∞vt = 1. On the other hand, Lemma 7 gives P( limt→∞vt = 1|V = 0) = 0. 
So (18) holds whenever lim
t→∞v
B
t = 1. Consider next the case limt→∞v
B
t =  < 1. Pick ε ∈ (0, 1−2 ). 
Then choosing t large enough ensures
 − ε < vBt (r) <  + ε < 1 − ε < vGt (r), ∀r ∈ {buyrec, sellrec}. (21)
Suppose by way of contradiction that (19) fails to hold, i.e. ρ ∈ (0, 1). Then, for any η > 0,∣∣P(rt = buyrec|ht ,B) − P(rt = buyrec|ht ,G)∣∣≤ η
for all sufficiently large t . So by choosing η sufficiently small we obtain k > 0 such that, for all 
sufficiently large t ,30{
ρt (r, g) > ρ + k, ∀r ∈ {buyrec, sellrec};
ρt (r, b) < ρ − k, ∀r ∈ {buyrec, sellrec}.
(22)
Now, a speculator’s valuation can be written as
vt (r, s) = vBt (r) + ρt (r, s)
(
vGt (r) − vBt (r)
)
. (23)
Thus, combining (21), (22) and (23) gives
vt (r, b) <  + ε + (ρ − k)(1 − + ε), ∀r ∈ {buyrec, sellrec}, (24)
and
vt (r, g) >  − ε + (ρ + k)(1 −  − 2ε), ∀r ∈ {buyrec, sellrec}, (25)
for all sufficiently large t . Choosing ε small enough, (24) and (25) in turn imply
min
r
{vt (r, g)} − max
r
{vt (r, b)} > k(1 − ) (26)
30 Recall, γG > γG .
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vt (buyrec, g) − vt (sellrec, g) and vt (buyrec, b) − vt (sellrec, b) can be made arbitrarily close 
to 0. The latter remark combined to (26) establishes vt (r, b) < pbt for all r ∈ {buyrec, sellrec}
and vt (r, g) > pat for all r ∈ {buyrec, sellrec}, that is, type-g speculators buy irrespective of rt
while type-b speculators sell irrespective of rt . It follows from these observations that the set of 
outcomes in which  < 1 and ρ ∈ (0, 1) both hold is a subset of the event in which speculators’ 
screening of the analyst is efficient eventually. Therefore, the set of outcomes in which  < 1 and 
ρ ∈ (0, 1) both hold has probability 0. This concludes the proof of the theorem. 
Definition 2. Say that B mimics G if for all ht ,
P(rt = buyrec|ht ,B) = P(rt = buyrec|ht ,G) (27)
and at least one of the following conditions holds:
P(rt = buyrec|ht , xt = 1,B) = 1, (28)
P(rt = sellrec|ht , xt = 0,B) = 1. (29)
Lemma 8. A mimicking strategy exists, and can be chosen moreover so as to satisfy
sup
ht
P(rt = buyrec|xt = 0, ht ,B) ≤ 1 − 1 − qG
qB
(30)
and
sup
ht
P(rt = sellrec|xt = 1, ht ,B) ≤ 1 − 1 − qG
qB
. (31)
Proof. Our objective will be to construct a mimicking strategy recursively, starting with t = 1. 
Let
P(r1 = buyrec|h1, x1 = 1,B) = 1 = P(r1 = sellrec|h1, x1 = 0,B). (32)
As v1 = 12 , then (32) implies (27) (with h1 substituting ht ). That (32) implies (28) and (29) is 
immediate.
Next suppose a strategy can be constructed such that, up to period T − 1 ≥ 1, for all ht with 
t ≤ T − 1, equation (27) and at least one of (28) and (29) are satisfied. Now fix a history hT ; we 
will consider 3 cases separately.
Case 1: if
vBT qB + (1 − vBT )(1 − qB) = vGT qG + (1 − vGT )(1 − qG),
let
P(rT = buyrec|hT , xT = 1,B) = 1 = P(rT = sellrec|hT , xT = 0,B).
Case 2: if instead
vBT qB + (1 − vBT )(1 − qB) < vGT qG + (1 − vGT )(1 − qG), (33)
let
P(rT = buyrec|hT , xT = 1,B) = 1,
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P(rT = buyrec|hT , xT = 0,B) = z(hT ),
with z(hT ) solving
vBT [qB + (1 − qB)z] + (1 − vBT )[(1 − qB) + qBz] = vGT qG + (1 − vGT )(1 − qG). (34)
The right-hand side of (34) is bounded above by qG, and qG < 1; the left-hand side evaluated 
at z = 1 is equal to 1; lastly, the left-hand side evaluated at z = 0 is strictly smaller than the 
right-hand side (by (33)). So z(hT ) exists (and is unique, moreover).
Case 3: if
vBT qB + (1 − vBT )(1 − qB) > vGT qG + (1 − vGT )(1 − qG), (35)
let
P(rT = sellrec|hT , xT = 0,B) = 1,
and
P(rT = sellrec|hT , xT = 1,B) = z(hT ),
with z(hT ) solving
vBT [qBz + (1 − qB)] + (1 − vBT )[(1 − qB)z + qB ] = vGT (1 − qG) + (1 − vGT )qG. (36)
The right-hand side of (36) is bounded above by qG, and qG < 1; the left-hand side evaluated 
at z = 1 is equal to 1; lastly, the left-hand side evaluated at z = 0 is strictly smaller than the 
right-hand side (by (35)). So z(hT ) exists (and is unique, moreover).
It is now a simple matter to check that, irrespective of which of the cases above holds, then 
given hT , equation (27) and at least one of (28) and (29) are satisfied. As hT was chosen arbi-
trarily, a strategy can therefore be constructed such that for all ht with t ≤ T , equation (27) and 
at least one of (28) and (29) are satisfied. But then a mimicking strategy exists, by induction.
We show next that the mimicking strategy constructed above satisfies (30). In Cases 1 
and 3, P(rt = buyrec|xt = 0, ht , B) = 0, so (30) trivially holds. In Case 2, P(rt = buyrec|xt =
0, ht , B) = z(ht ), with z(ht ) solving (34). So we need to show z(ht ) ≤ 1 − 1−qGqB . Notice that the 
left-hand side of (34) is increasing in z and, as qB ≥ 12 , is also increasing in vBt . The right-hand 
side of (34) is bounded above by qG. Since vBt ≥ 0, the solution to
(1 − qB) + qBz = qG
is thus an upper bound for z(ht ). This gives z(ht ) ≤ 1 − 1−qGqB . The mimicking strategy con-
structed above therefore satisfies (30). That it satisfies (31) follows by symmetry. 
Define in the remaining of the appendix, for any non-degenerate mixed strategy of the B
analyst,
Lθ,t := P(ht |V = 0, θ)
P(ht |V = 1, θ)
and
φrθ,t :=
P(rt = r|V = 0, ht , θ)
P(rt = r|V = 1, ht , θ) .
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vGt (sellrec) 
= vBt (sellrec) and vGt (buyrec) 
= vBt (buyrec):
vBt (buyrec) − vBt (sellrec)
vGt (sellrec) − vBt (sellrec)
= (1 + φ
sell
G,tLG,t )(φ
sell
B,t − φbuyB,t )
(1 + φbuyB,t LB,t )(φsellB,t − φsellG,t LG,tLB,t )
; (37)
vBt (buyrec) − vBt (sellrec)
vGt (buyrec) − vBt (buyrec)
= (1 + φ
buy
G,tLG,t )(φ
sell
B,t − φbuyB,t )
(1 + φsellB,tLB,t )(φbuyB,t − φbuyG,t LG,tLB,t )
; (38)
vGt (buyrec) − vGt (sellrec)
vGt (buyrec) − vBt (buyrec)
= (1 + φ
buy
B,t LB,t )(φ
sell
G,t − φbuyG,t )
(1 + φsellG,tLG,t )(φbuyB,t LB,tLG,t − φ
buy
G,t )
; (39)
vGt (buyrec) − vBt (buyrec)
vGt (sellrec) − vBt (sellrec)
=
(1 + φsellG,tLG,t )(1 + φsellB,tLB,t )(φbuyB,t − φbuyG,t LG,tLB,t )
(1 + φbuyG,tLG,t )(1 + φbuyB,t LB,t )(φsellB,t − φsellG,t LG,tLB,t )
. (40)
Proof. Applying Bayes’ rule,
vθt (r) =
1
1 + φrθ,tLθ,t
.
Tedious but straightforward algebra then yields (37)–(40). 
Lemma 10. If B mimics G, (30)–(31) hold, and qB > 12 then
inf
ht
∣∣φsellB,t − φbuyB,t ∣∣> 0. (41)
Furthermore, if lim
t→∞nt = +∞, then
lim
t→∞LB,t = 0. (42)
Proof. Assume qB > 12 , B mimics G and (30)–(31) hold. Fix a history ht . Either (28) holds, or (29) does. We consider below the two possibilities.
If (28) holds then P(rt = buyrec|xt = 0, ht , B) = z(ht ), with z(ht ) solving (34). Hence,
P(rt = buyrec|V = 1, ht ,B) − P(rt = buyrec|V = 0, ht ,B)
= qB + (1 − qB)z(ht ) − [(1 − qB) + qBz(ht )]
= (2qB − 1)(1 − z(ht ))
≥ (2qB − 1)(1 − qG)
qB
,
where we used (30) to obtain the final inequality.
If instead (29) holds then P(rT = sellrec|hT , xT = 1, B) = z(hT ), with z(ht ) solving (36). 
Hence,
P(rt = buyrec|V = 1, ht ,B) − P(rt = buyrec|V = 0, ht ,B)
= qB(1 − z(ht )) − (1 − qB)(1 − z(ht ))
= (2qB − 1)(1 − z(ht ))
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qB
,
where we used (31) to obtain the final inequality.
As ht was chosen arbitrarily, we find
inf
ht
{
P(rt = buyrec|V = 1, ht ,B) − P(rt = buyrec|V = 0, ht ,B)
}
≥ (2qB − 1)(1 − qG)
qB
. (43)
Since qB > 12 and qG < 1, (43) implies (41).
For the second part of the lemma, write
LB,t = P(ht |V = 0,B)
P(ht |V = 1,B)
=
∏
τ<t
P(rτ , yτ |hτ ,V = 0,B)
P(rτ , yτ |hτ ,V = 1,B)
=
(∏
τ<t
P(rτ |hτ ,V = 0,B)
P(rτ |hτ ,V = 1,B)
)
·
(∏
τ<t
P(yτ |rτ , hτ ,V = 0,B)
P(yτ |rτ , hτ ,V = 1,B)
)
.
Now yτ depends on (rτ , sτ , hτ ) only and sτ is independent of V . Therefore P(yτ |rτ , hτ , V =
0, B) = P(yτ |rτ , hτ , V = 1, B), and so the second bracketed term is equal to 1. If moreover 
lim
t→∞nt = +∞ then, by virtue of (43), the first bracketed term goes to zero as t → ∞. 
Proof of Theorem 2: Suppose B mimics G (we are not saying at this point that such a strategy 
is optimal for B). Note to start with that if we were able to show that, for any t and any history 
ht ,
min
s
vt (buyrec, s) > pat ; (44)
max
s
vt (sellrec, s) < pbt , (45)
then we would deduce (by induction) (a) P(ρt = ρ1) = 1 for all t and ht , and also (b) mimicking 
G is an optimal strategy of the B analyst. So to prove the theorem we just need to show that 
(44)–(45) can be made to hold for all t and all ht under the premises that B mimics G and 
ρt = ρ1 irrespective of t and ht . Now consider  > 0. As long as γG ∈ (0, 1), we can choose 
η > 0 such that γB > γG − η implies
max
r,s
|ρ1(r, s) − ρ1| < ε. (46)
Our goal in the rest of the proof will be to show that if
(i) B mimics G,
(ii) (30)–(31) hold,
(iii) (46) holds,
(iv) ρt = ρ1 for all t and ht ,
then (44)–(45) hold for all t and ht as long as we choose ε sufficiently small. By virtue of the 
previous remarks, this will prove the theorem.
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vGt (buyrec) > vBt (buyrec) and vGt (sellrec) > vBt (sellrec) (the other cases are analogous). In this 
case (44)–(45) hold if we can show the following inequalities:
(ρ1 − )vGt (buyrec) + (1 − ρ1 + )vBt (buyrec) > pat ; (47)
(ρ1 + )vGt (sellrec) + (1 − ρ1 − )vBt (sellrec) < pbt . (48)
Let αt := P(rt = buyrec|ht ) and βt := P(rt = sellrec|ht ). The prices appearing in (47) and (48)
can then be written as
pat =
παt
παt + 1−π3
[ρ1vGt (buyrec) + (1 − ρ1)vBt (buyrec)] +
(
1 − παt
παt + 1−π3
)
vt ;
pbt =
πβt
πβt + 1−π3
[ρ1vGt (sellrec) + (1 − ρ1)vBt (sellrec)] +
(
1 − πβt
πβt + 1−π3
)
vt .
Define vt (r) := ρ1vGt (r) + (1 − ρ1)vBt (r). Then vt = αtvt (buyrec) + (1 − αt )vt (sellrec). Some 
straightforward algebra now shows that we can write (47)–(48) as
vt (buyrec) − vt (sellrec)
vGt (buyrec) − vBt (buyrec)
>
(
1
1 − αt
)(

1 − παt
παt+ 1−π3
)
; (49)
vt (buyrec) − vt (sellrec)
vGt (sellrec) − vBt (sellrec)
>
(
1
αt
)(

1 − παt
παt+ 1−π3
)
. (50)
Define
ct :=
vGt (buyrec) − vGt (sellrec)
vGt (buyrec) − vBt (buyrec)
;
dt :=
vBt (buyrec) − vBt (sellrec)
vGt (buyrec) − vBt (buyrec)
.
Then (49) becomes
ρ1
c
t + (1 − ρ1)dt >
(
1
1 − αt
)(

1 − παt
παt+ 1−π3
)
. (51)
Note first that vGt (buyrec) > vGt (sellrec), vBt (buyrec) > vBt (sellrec) and, moreover, we are fo-
cusing on histories such that vGt (buyrec) > vBt (buyrec). Thus ct > 0 and dt > 0 for all relevant 
histories. Furthermore, Lemma 10 shows that lim
nt→+∞
LB,t = 0 and repeating arguments used in 
the proof of Theorem 1 establishes lim
nt→+∞
LG,t = lim
nt→+∞
LG,t
LB,t
= 0. Hence, applying Lemmata 9
and 10,
lim
nt→+∞
dt = lim
nt→+∞
(
φsellB,t − φbuyB,t
φ
buy
B,t
)
> 0.
For all relevant histories, the left-hand side of (51) is therefore bounded below by a strictly 
positive number. As αt is bounded away from 0 and 1, choosing ε sufficiently small assures that 
(51) holds. Repeating the steps above starting from (50) instead of (49) shows in a similar manner 
that (50) holds as long as we choose ε sufficiently small. 
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Proof of Proposition 5. The method of proof is similar to the method used to prove Theorem 2. 
Suppose B mimics G (we are not saying at this point that such a strategy is optimal for B). Note 
to start with that if we were able to show that, for any t and any history ht ,
min
s
vt (buyrec, s) > pat ; (52)
max
s
vt (sellrec, s) < pbt , (53)
then we would deduce (by induction) (a) P(ρt = ρ1) = 1 for all t and ht , and also (b) mimicking 
G is an optimal strategy of the B analyst. So to prove the proposition we just need to show 
that (52)–(53) can be made to hold for all t and all ht under the premises that B mimics G and 
ρt = ρ1 irrespective of t and ht . Now consider  > 0. Choosing ρ < 1 sufficiently large, ρ1 > ρ
implies
max
r,s
|ρ1(r, s) − ρ1| < ε. (54)
Our goal in the rest of the proof will be to show that if
(i) B mimics G,
(ii) (54) holds,
(iii) ρt = ρ1 for all t and ht ,
then (52)–(53) hold for all t and ht as long as we choose ε sufficiently small. By virtue of the 
previous remarks, this will prove the proposition.
Assume (i)-(iii) listed above. Below, we focus on histories for which vGt (sellrec) > 1/2 (the 
other cases are analogous). In this case (52)–(53) hold if we can show the following inequalities:
(ρ1 − )vGt (buyrec) + (1 − ρ1 + )
1
2
> pat ; (55)
(ρ1 + )vGt (sellrec) + (1 − ρ1 − )
1
2
< pbt . (56)
Let αt := P(rt = buyrec|ht ) and βt := P(rt = sellrec|ht ). The prices appearing in (55) and (56)
can then be written as
pat =
παt
παt + 1−π3
[ρ1vGt (buyrec) + (1 − ρ1)
1
2
] +
(
1 − παt
παt + 1−π3
)
vt ;
pbt =
πβt
πβt + 1−π3
[ρ1vGt (sellrec) + (1 − ρ1)
1
2
] +
(
1 − πβt
πβt + 1−π3
)
vt .
Define vt (r) := ρ1vGt (r) + (1 − ρ1) 12 . Then vt = αtvt (buyrec) + (1 − αt )vt (sellrec). Some 
straightforward algebra now shows that we can write (55)–(56) as
ρ1
(
vGt (buyrec) − vGt (sellrec)
)
vGt (buyrec) − 12
>
(
1
1 − αt
)(

1 − παt
παt+ 1−π3
)
; (57)
ρ1
(
vGt (buyrec) − vGt (sellrec)
)
vGt (sellrec) − 12
>
(
1
αt
)(

1 − παt
παt+ 1−π3
)
. (58)
334 J. Rüdiger, A. Vigier / Journal of Economic Theory 180 (2019) 304–335Next, denote vGt (r) the valuation conditional on θ = G, rt = r and Vt = Vt−1. We can then write
vGt (buyrec) − vGt (sellrec) = (1 − z)[vGt (buyrec) − vGt (sellrec)]
+ z[vG1 (buyrec) − vG1 (sellrec)].
This gives vGt (buyrec) − vGt > z[vG1 (buyrec) − vG1 (sellrec)] > 0. The left-hand sides of (57) and 
(58) are therefore bounded below by a strictly positive number. As αt is bounded away from 0 
and 1, choosing ε sufficiently small assures that (57)–(58) hold. 
Appendix. Supplementary material
Supplementary material related to this article can be found online at https://doi .org /10 .1016 /
j .jet .2019 .01 .001.
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